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EVIDENCE-DYING

)EcLARATON.-In a trial for homicide, a dying declara-

tion of the deceased, "That man murdered me," referring to the defendant,
was offered in evidence. Held: It was error to admit this evidence, on
the grounds that "murder," implying a felonious homicide, a killing with
malice aforethought and intention, was an opinion or conclusion of the
declarant. Pilcher v. State, 77 So. 75 (Ala. 1917).
The learned court, with great astuteness, distinguishes the declaration of the principal case from a somewhat similar declaration, "He killed
me," admitted in evidence in the case of Parker v. State, io Ala. App. 53
(1914). Such a distinction, while calculated to promote the cause of legal
education among dying declarants, is hardly likely to prove itself a tower of
defense against the oft-repeated assaults upon technicalities of the law. It is
surprising to find that the court made the distinction at all, and did not
flatly overrule the earlier case on the ground that the declaration, "He
killed me," was obviously a conclusion on the part of the deceased, he
not yet having died. Strangely enough, however, the principal case does
not seem to stand alone in its conclusion. Bateson v. State, 46 Tex. Crim.
t. 34 (19o4).: "They have murdered me without cause," excluded; State
v. Horn, 204 Mo. 528 (C966)*: "I fired in self-defense," excluded. Contra,
State v. Mace, z18 N. C. 1244 0r896): "They have murdered me for nothing
in the world," admitted; also, dicta, in State v. Baldwin, 79 Ia. 714, 721
(00o).
The application of the opinion rule to dying declarations has often
lead to ludicrous results. Thus learned arguments and solemn decisions
are to be found on the question whether dying declarations such as "He
butchered me," or "He shot me down like a dog," are to be excluded
from the charmed circle of evidence, because they constitute only the
opinion of the declarant. State v. Gile, 8 Wash. 12 (1894); State v.
Saunders, 14 Ore. 300 (1886); White v. State, ioo Ga. 659 (1897). The
decisions have also been very often conflicting, and in view of the nature
of dying declarations, and their importance as evidence, generally unsatisfactory. For example, a statement that the deceased knew the accused
had poisoned him, had given him his dose in a drink of whiskey, was
excluded despite its apparent evidentiary value. Berry v. State, 63 Ark.
382 (189#). On the other hand, an unchivalrous court admitted a declaration, "I know my mother-in-law poisoned me," though the declarant had
no better grounds for her statement than existed in the former case.
Shenkenberger v. State, 154 Ind. 630 (goo); semble, Lipscomb v. State,
75 Miss. 559 (1897).
These questions have arisen entirely on the theory that dying declarations are subject to the same rules which govern other evidence, and that,
as has frequently been said, they are admissible only when they could be
given by the declarant if he were living and sworn as a witness. People
v. Wasson, 65 CaL 538, 539 (1884); Boyle v. State, Io5 Ind. 470, 472 (1885);
(274)
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State v. Elkins, Io Mo. 344, 351 (x89o).

This position is fallacious.

The

only reason that opinion evidence is ever excluded is that the witness's
opinion is regarded as superfluous, and the jury supposed to be equally
competent to draw the correct conclusion without the aid of that opinion,
where the pertinent facts can be specifically detailed and described. Cornell
v. Green, io S. & R 14, 16 (Pa. 1823); Clifford v. Richardson, i8 Vt.
620, 626 (r846); Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 27, 35 (1858); B. & 0. R. Co.
v. Schultz, 43 0. St. 27o (1885). However, in the case of dying declarations, it is impossible to -obtain from the witness any more details than
are contained in the declaration, so that the declarant's inferences from
things within his knowledge are actually of the greatest value. Since,
by the very nature of the case, the statements of the deceased must often
be the most important, and perhaps the only evidence in the case, it is
obvious that such testimony should not be excluded merely because it
represents a conclusion, provided it is based on the declarant's knowledge.
Of course, where the declaration is simply a guess, it ought not to
be admitted. The declarant must have had actual opportunity for observation, and his statement must be made of personal knowledge.. Courts have
therefore very properly excluded statements where it appears from the
declaration itself, or from other circumstances, that the deceased had, or
could have had, no knowledge of the fact asserted, but was making a
pure conjecture. Binns v. State, 46 Ind. 311 (1874); Jones v. State, 52
Ark 345 (1889); State v. Burnett, 47 W. Va. 731 (igoo). But the grounds
of such exclusion should be, not the opinion rule, but the lack of personal
knowledge or observation.
The rule against opinion evidence has been 'almost universally applied
to dying declarations, though a few exceptions have been made in individual
jurisdictions. Thus it was early held in Kentucky that declarations of mere
opinion were admissible when in favor of the accused, to explain his
conduct or motives. Haney v. Commonwealth, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 203, 205
(1883). It has also been held that such declarations, whether favorable to
the accused or not, are admissible when facts on which the opinion might
be founded, are peculiarly within the declarant's knowledge, even though
such facts are not stated in the declaration. State v. Lee, 58 S. C. 335,
355 (igoo); but contra, Sweat v. State, io7 Ga. 712 (i899).
These are
but a small step, however, and it seems likely that many of the absurd
results of subjecting dying declarations to the rule against opinion evidence
will remain.
NGLiGENcE-DEaGEES

OF NEGLiGFNC--Owner of an automobile invited

the plaintiff to ride with him, and, through the negligence of the chauffeur
in running the car, the plaintiff was injured. Held: Plaintiff was not
entitled to recover, because he had failed to prove gross negligence. Massalatti v. Fitzroy, u8 N. E. 168 (Mass.).
The extent to which degrees of negligence exist at common law is a
much mooted point. One would suppose that since Coggs v. Barnard, 2
Ld. Raym. 9o9 (i7o3), it would be settled that there were such degrees.
But much doubt has been thrown on the doctrine by later English cases, in

276

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

which gross negligence was called merely ordinary negligence plus a vituperative ephithet.

Wilson v. Brett, ii

M. & W. 113 (1843).

But it may be

assumed from the language of the courts in Giblin v. McMullen, L. R. 2
P. C. 311 (i868); and Moffat v. Bateman, L. R. 3 P. C. X5 (i869), that
the doctrine is now established in England.
Of course it is plain that under different circumstances, different degrees
of care would be required. The doctrine that degrees of negligence exist
is not that any material departure from the standard of what is reasonable
under the circumstances, but either a very slight departure only, or a very
grave departure, may be required to constitute actionable negligence. Some
courts have flatly denied that such degrees exist or are of practical
importance. Oregon Co. v. Roe, 176 F. 715 (igio); Colorado & S. Ry. v.
Webb, 36 Col. 224 (i9o6); McPheeters v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R. Co., 45
Mo. 2 (187o); Missouri, Pacific Ry. Co. v. Watters, 96 Pac. 346 (Kansas
i9o8); Vandalia R. R. v. Clem, 96 N. E. 789 (i911); Reeves v. Lutz, 162
Other courts hold that liability does not depend on
S. W. 28o (1913).
the degree of negligence, though the damages may. Denny v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. R. R., 13o N. W. 363 (1911); Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Catlett, 177 Fed. 71 (1911). Others still have flatly denied this doctrine, and
asserted, in accord with the principal case, that liability may depend on the
degree of negligence. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Sheets, ii Ky. Law
Rep. 781 (I89O); Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Dodge, 23 Ky. Law Rep.
i959 (I9O2); Belt Ry. Co. v. Banicki, io2 Ill. App. 642 (i902); Astin v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R, 143 Wis. 477 (I9i).
If there are degrees of negligence, what is gross negligence? Some
courts hold that it implies an intent, either to do the negligent act, knowing
it to be negligent, or an intentional failure to act, wilfulness in short.
Giblin v. McMullen, L. R. 2 P. C. 317 (1868); Denman v. Johnston, 85
Mich. 387 (i89i) ; Rideout v. Winnebago Traction Co., 123 Wis. 297 (1904).

Other courts hold that either wilfulness, or a reckless and wanton disregard
for the safety of others is sufficient. Willard v. Chicago, N. W. Ry. Co.,
136 N. W. 646 (r912) ; Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., io9 Pac. 9i (i9o9).
Still others insist that even gross negligence is always something short of
wilfulness. Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 652 (i859); Terre Haute Ry.
Co. v. Graham, 95 Ind. 293 (1883); Jacksonville & S. E. R. R. Co. v.
Southworth, 135 Ill. 250 (i8go); Parker v. Pennsylvania Co., 134 Ind. 673
(1892); Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Starks, 92 N. E. 54 (I910).
Some courts hold that gross negligence is want of slight care when that
only is required, and slight negligence is the want of great care when that
is required, and not a-slight want of ordinary care. R. R. Co. v. Lockwood,
17 Wall. 357 (i872) ; Griffin v. Town of Willow, 43 Wis. 5o9 (1877) ; Lothian
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 126 N. W. 621 (i910). But the majority of
courts seem to hold that gross negligence is simply a degree of negligence
materially greater than ordinary negligence. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v.
McCoy, 8i Ky. 4o3 (1883); Devine v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 205
Mass. 416 (i9io); Burton v. Construction Co., 162 Ky. 366 (1914).

The Massachusetts courts themselves have had grave difficulty in defining
gross negligence. In Dolphin v. Worcester Consolidated St. R. R., i89
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Mass. 270 (x905), it was said that gross negligence may exist where
only slight care is required, thus repudiating the doctrine that gross negligence is failure to exercise only slight care. In Devine v. N. Y., N. H. &
H. 1. R., supra, it was held that gross negligence .was simply worse than
ordinary negligence. In Martin v. Boston & Maine R. R., 2o5 Mass. 16 (1gIo),
it was said that the highly dangerous consequences to be apprehended in
one case might contribute to render that gross negligence which was not
such in another case, thus confusing degree of negligence with the degree
of care that in the circumstances constitutes reasonable care.
Where a count charges ordinary negligence, it has been held that proof
of gross negligence is inadmissible. This is in a jurisdiction where gross
negligence would prevent the defendant from setting up contributory negligence as a defense, and is on the ground that it would amount to a variation
in pleading, Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Marker, 1o3 Ala. i6o (1893).
But this is against the weight of authority, Pa. Co. v. Krick, 47 Ind. 368
(z874), on the ground that the degree of negligence is a matter of proof, not
pleading: Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Carter, 2o IIl. 390 (i858); Louisville
& N. R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 87 Ky. 327 (1888); Schumacher v. St. Louis &
S. F. R. R. Co., 39 Fed. z74 (i889). In those states where gross negligence
implies wilfulness it would seem logical to hold that proof of gross negligence is not admissible where ordinary negligence is charged, and vice
versa, and it is so held. McClellan v. Chippewa Valley P. R. Co., iio Wis.
326 ( gio).
NumLIaNC--GaRATurous UNDErTAING-LABIwITY TO A SOcIAL GUEST.-

Defendant invited plaintiff to ride with him in his automobile. Through the
negligence of the chauffeur, plaintiff was injured. Held: The plaintiff could
not recover. Proof of ordinary negligence is not enough, plaintiff must
prove gross negligence to charge one who was transporting him free of
charge. Massaletti v. Fitzroy, ix8 N. E. 168 (Mass.).
The court argued that, according to Coggs v. Barnard, 2 Ld. Raym.
909 (i7o3), a depositary, i. e., a gratuitous bailee, can only be charged by
proof of gross negligence; that a mandatory, or one who undertakes a
gratuitous transportation, is not chargeable by proof of less negligence than
is required to charge a depositary; and that this was a case of a mandatory.
The distinctions of depositary, mandatory, etc., made in Coggs v. Barnard, are distinctions with reference to the liability of one dealing with
goods, not persons. To speak of a depositary or mandatory of a person
is to make a person a chattel. The analogy between the principal case and
a mandatory is vitiated by the fact that a carrier of persons is bound to
exercise a higher degree of care than a carrier of goods. It is submitted
that the liability to a social guest is more analogous to the liability of a
licensor than to that of a mandatory.
The licensor owes the licensee the duty to refrain from any further
negligence which will increase the dangers of the premises which he has
permitted the licensee to come upon. Gallagher v. Humphrey, 6 Law Times
N. S. 684 (1862); Sweeny v. Old Colony R. R., 92 Mass. 368 (1865);
Barry v. N. Y. Central R. R., 92 N. Y. 289 (1883); Taylor v. R. R., 113
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Pa. 162 (1886); Mitchell v. R. R. 68 N. H. 96 (i894); Pomponio v. R. R.,
66 Conn. 528 (895).
But a licensor is not bound to make the premises
safe, short of not creating a trap. Batchelor v. Fortescue, L. . ii Q. B. D.
474 (1883); Fitzpatrick v. Cumberland Glass Co., 6I N. J. L. 378 (8w8);
Gibson v. Sziepiensld, 37 Ill. App. 6oi (i8gi); Monroe v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. R., I5i N. C. 374 (i9og); Schiffer v. Sauer Co., 238 Pa. 55o (i913).
It has been held a number of times that this was the duty of one who
invited another to ride with him, i. e., to refrain from doing any negligent
acts by which the danger was increased or a new danger created, although
by dicta it is asserted that the host would not be bound to furnish a safe
vehicle or a safe horse. Mayberry v. Sivey, I8 Kan. 291 (877); Pigeon
v. Lane, 80 Conn. 237 (907) ; Patnode v. Foote, 138 N. Y. Supp. 22i (1912) ;
Grimshaw v. Lake Shore, etc., R. P., 98 N. E. 762 (1912), where it was
held that one who was on a freight engine by invitation of the engineer
was a licensee and entitled to ordinary care, though to be on the engine
was against the rules of the company: Fitzgerald v. Boyd, 9i At. 547 (Md.
1914);

Beard v. Yusmeier, 158 Ky. 153 (914).

There is even authority for the proposition that failure to keep the
premises in a reasonably safe condition constitutes 'negligence to a social
guest as well as to a business guest. Davis v. Congregational Society, 129
Mass. 367 (i88o); Howe v. Ohmart, 7 Ind. App. 32 (i897). Contra, Southcote v. Stanley, i Hurl & N. 246 (1856). It may perhaps be argued that
it is reasonable to imply from the express invitation given by the host to
the guest, that the host has an interest in his guest's presence, and such
an interest in his presence would put the social guest on the same footing
as a business guest, and entitle him to demand reasonable care to keep the
premises in a safe condition for him.
There is also authority for the assertion that one who actually enters
on the execution of a gratuitous undertaking, and does it negligently, is
liable to another injured thereby. Rehder v. Miller, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 344
(i9o8). This has been held -repeatedly where a landlord volunteers to
repair, and does it so negligently that the tenant is injured. Benden v.
Manning, 2 N. H. 289 (i83o); Gill v. Middleton, io5 Mass. 477 (i87o);
Little v. McAdaras, 38 Mo. App. 187 (I889); Gregor v. Cady, 82 Me. 13r
(1889); O'Dwyer v. O'Brien, 13 N. Y. App. Div. 570 (1897); Aldag v. Ott,

28 Ind. App. 542 (igoi). 'In Massachusetts the doctrine of Gill v. Middleton has been restricted, so that while a tenant may recover for his landlord's negligence in repairing gratuitously, a guest of the tenant may not.
Thomas v. Lane, 22r Mass. 447 (1915). In England, not even the tenant may
recover. Malone v. Laskey, L. R. 1907, 2 K. B. D. 141. But in England it
has been held that one undertaking -a gratuitous transportation of a person
is answerable for failure to exercise ordinary care. Harris v. Perry, I9O3,
2 K. B. 219. This is contra to a dictum in Moffat v. Bateman, L. R. 3 P. C.
115 (iS6g), which, though cited in the principal case for the proposition
that one gratuitously transporting another is liable only for gross negligence, was in reality decided on the ground that there was no evidence of
even ordinary negligence,
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TORTs-LIAnIuTY FOR INDUCING BREACH oF CONTRACT.-The defendant
induced the plaintiff's fianci to break off the engagement with her, by a
threat to have him placed in an asylum. Slander had been used also, but
the action for that was now barred by the Statute of Limitations. Held:
The plaintiff cannot recover. Homan v. Hall, 165 N. W. 88x (Nebraska).
This is in accord with the authorities. In Leonard v. Whetstone, 34
Ind. App. 383 (i9o4); it was held that a parent is liable to his son's
fiance for slander against her in inducing him to break the engagement,
but in a dictum it was said that without the slander no action would have
lain. Where defendant debauched plaintiff's fiancee and alienated her affec.
tions, and the plaintiff in consequence broke off the engagement, it is held
that the plaintiff has no cause of action. Davis v. Condit, 124 Minn.. 395
(1914).
There is no right of action for alienating the affections of a
betrothed or even debauching her; such a right arises only from the marital
relation. Case v. Smith, xo7 Mich. 416 (i8g5).
A contract to get married seems to be unusual in that no action lies
for inducing a breach of it. For other contracts there is at least a decided
split of authority. Thus it is actionable nearly everywhere to induce a
breach of contract between master and servant, or employer and
employee, even though no means tortious in themselves are employed. Read
v. Friendly Society, L. R. I902, 2 K. B. D. 732; Glamorgan Coal Co. v.
South Wales Mimer's Fed., L. R. 1903, 2 K. B. D. 545; Walker v. Cronin,
1o7 Mass. 555 (1871); Flaccus v. Smith, igg Pa. 128 (ixox); Jersey City
Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. E. 759 (192) ; Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N. H.
34s (19o9); Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206 (887), an action by the
employee. But New York does not hold one who induces the breach of
such a contract. liable, where no tortious means are used, on the ground
that the English Statute of Laborers, on which the early English cases
based their decision that a master could recover for enticing away his
servant, was not in force in New York. National Protective Assn. v.
Cummings, 11o N. Y. 315 (igoa). A contract for professional services is
protected as is a master and servant contract from* interference by a third
party. Lumley v. Gye, 2 Ellis & B. 216 (1853). Contra, DeJong v. Behrman,
131 N. Y. Supp. 1083 (g).
There is much less unanimity as to liability for inducing a breach of
mercantile contracts, where the act inducing the breach is not itself a tort.
Cases holding that one inducing the breach is not liable are: Ashley v.
Dixon, 48 N. Y. 430 (1872); Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121 (i891);
Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578 (1893); Glencoe Sand Co. v. Hudson Bros.,
138 Mo. 439 (x897) ; Sweeny v. Smith, 171 Fed. 645 (gog) ; Swain v. Johnson,
151 N. C. 93 (i9o9); Turner v. Fletcher, 165 N. Y. Supp. 282 (1917). Cases
holding that one who induces a breach of a coitract is liable, are: Bowen
v. Hall, L. R. 1881, 6 Q. B. D. 333; Jones v. Stanly, 76 N. C. 355 (1877);
Heath v. American Book Co., 97 Fed. 533 (1899); Marten v. Reilly, 109 Wis.
464 (1go); Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443 (igo3); Mahoney v.
Roberts, 11 S. W. 225 (Ark. i9o8); Motley Green Co. v. Detroit Steel
Co., 16I Fed. 389 (x9o8) ; American Melting Co. v. Keitel, 209 Fed. 351 (1913) ;
Rivet Co. v. Exeter Boot Co., 159 Fed. 824 (19o8); Faunce v. Searles, 142
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N. W. 816 (Minn. 1913) ; Kock v. Burgess, 149 N. W. 858 (1914) ; Twitchell
v. Nelson, 126 Minn. 423 (1914); Bowen v. Speer, I66 S. W. 1183 (1914);

Wakin v. Wakin, 18o S. W. 471 (915);
Guaranty Corpn., 24o Fed.

222

(1917).

Automobile Insurance Co. v.

Illinois apparently requires malice in

fact to make the defendant liable. Legris v. Marcotte, 129 Ill. App. 67
(igo6).
Where contract is unenforceable or terminable at the will of the party
induced to break it, it has been held that the one who induced the termination of the contract is liable. Cumberland Glass Mnfg, Co. v. Dewitt, 120
Md. 386 (1913), where contract was unenforceable by the statute of frauds:
London Guarantee Co. v. Horn, 2o6 Ill. 493 (I9O4), where, however, the
means used. by the defendant to induce the breach of contract was a
threat to do something he had no legal right to do, namely, break a contract
he had with the plaintiff's contracting party. But the weight of authority
holds that the defendant is not liable unless the contract of which he
induced the breach was a binding one. Allen v. Flood, L. R. 1898, A. C. i;
Raycroft v. Tayntor, 6 Vt. 219 (1896), where malice in fact existed, yet
the defendant was held not liable: McGuire v. Gerstly, 204 U. S. 489 (i9o6),
terminating partnership for no specified term;. Roberts v. Clark, 1o3 S. W.
417 (Tex. i9o7); Tennessee Coal & Iron Co. v. Kelley, 163 Ala. 348 (Igo9).
TORTS-NEGLiGENCE-WHO

MAY

RECOVER-UNDISCLOSED

PRINCIPAI--A

telegram accepting an offer, addressed to the plaintiff's agent by a third
party, was not promptly delivered by the defendant telegraph company. The
goods offered were sold subsequently at a loss. Held: The plaintiff cannot
recover damages for the defendant's negligence, because he was an undisclosed principal of the addressee. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Lowden, 77 So.
145 (Miss. 19170.

The right of the sendee of. a telegram to recover for negligence on the
company's part in the transmission of, or failure to deliver, a message is
generially recognized throughout the United States. Western Union v.
Dubois, 128 Ill. 248 (i889) ; Young v. Western Union, lo7 N. C. 370 (i89o) ;
Baily & Co. v. Western Union, 227 Pa. _r= (191o). Two main theories on
which recovery is allowed seem to prevail. One is that the telegraph company is a public agent, with a duty to transmit messages properly, imposed
upon it by law, and is liable to anyone injured by its negligence in violation
of that duty. Actions on this theory are ex delicto. Wadsworth v. Western
Union, 86 Tenn. 695, 712 (i888); Western Union v. Dubois, supra; Lee v.
Western Union, 5I M6. App. 375 (1892). The other doctrine holds that the
addressee is the beneficiary of the contract of transmission made by the
sender and the company, and may sue the latter when deprived by its
negligence of a benefit he would otherwise have had. The sendee's action
under this rule is ex contractu. Russell v. Western Union, 57 Kan. 23o
(1896); Frazier v. Western Union, 45 Ore. 414 (1904).

It is often very

hard to determine on which of these two theories the various decisions
have been based, as the legal principles in this very modern field have not yet
been well settled.
The few cases dealing with the right of the sendee's undisclosed prin-
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cipal to sue have uniformly denied him recovery. Lee v. Western Union,
51 Mo. App. 375, 380 (1892); Western Union v. Schriver, xrx Fed. 538
(igo5). In support of this conclusion, decisions and dicta are cited to the
effect that an addressee may recover from the telegraph company only
when the company has knowledge or notice, from the message itself or
other circumstances, that the message was intended for the sendee's benefit.
Western Union v. Coffin, 88 Tex. 94 (1895); Frazier v. Western Union,
supra; Anniston Cordage Co. v. Western Union, i6i Ala. 216 (igog). Since
it is a simple rule of contracts that a third party must be intended as the
beneficiary of the contract by both contracting. parties before he can sue
on it, this reasoning is properly applied in jurisdictions where the sendee
recovers on the breach of the company's contract with the sender, because
obviously the sendee's principal, if undisclosed *to the company, could not
have been intended by it as the beneficiary.
But in jurisdictions where the sendee recovers in tort, on the theory
of a breach of a public duty, the same reasoning does not apply. A leading
case under this doctrine states that the telegraph company is liable to the
sendee because "from the peculiar character of its business, it is connected
with the sendee of the message so far as to impose upon it a duty to
deliver the intelligence. . . " Shingleur v.Western Union, 72 Miss. o3o,
035 (i895). The duty imposed is that of delivery-a duty which is owing
only to that class of the public composed of addressees. Since the sendee's
undisclosed principal is not a member of this class, he clearly should not
recover since there has been no breach of a duty owing to him. It is on
this broad principle of torts that the principal case should have gone, arising
as it did in a jurisdiction where the sendee recovers on the tort, and not
the contract, of the company. Shingleur v. Western Union, supra.
Of course the sender's undisclosed principal may always recover on the
contract for losses actually sustained under the common doctrines of agency
which allow him to step in and sue in his own name on a contract made by
his agent. West v. Western Union, 39 Kan. 93 (i888); Dodd v. Postal Tel.
Co., 1T2 Ga. 685 (Tgoo).

